External trade and monetary policy in a currency area by Martina Cecioni
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)




















0   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
External trade and monetary policy in a currency area
by Martina Cecioni
Number 738 - January 2010The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working 
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:  Patrizio Pagano, Alfonso Rosolia, Ugo Albertazzi, Andrea Neri,   
Giulio  Nicoletti,  Paolo  Pinotti,  Enrico  Sette,  Marco  Taboga,  Pietro  Tommasino, 
Fabrizio Venditti.
Editorial Assistants:  Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.EXTERNAL TRADE AND MONETARY POLICY IN A CURRENCY AREA 
by Martina Cecioni*  
 
Abstract 
For historical and geographical reasons, the member countries of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) display different degrees of external trade openness. The paper lays 
out a model for a currency area composed of two regions. One region is more open to trade 
with a third country outside the area than the other. Using the utility-based loss function for 
the currency area, the optimal monetary policy is compared to the one for a homogeneous 
area. In the model with heterogeneity, the relative competitiveness across regions influences 
the extent to which shocks are transmitted to the area-wide inflation and output gap. Under a 
plausible calibration for the EMU, the optimal policy plan exhibits a stronger tendency 
towards currency area exchange rate stabilization than the one in the homogeneity case. 
Moreover, it is welfare-improving to forgo some area-wide inflation stabilization to dampen 
inflation differentials.  
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations    1 Introduction∗
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) the member
countries agreed to relinquish individual control on both the nominal inter-
est rate and the nominal exchange rate. Some empirical studies conﬁrm that
the establishment of the currency area, by irrevocably ﬁxing the exchange
rates across member countries and thereby eliminating the related risk in
foreign transactions, stimulated intra euro area trade.1 However, there is no
evidence of diversion of trade away from non-member countries (Micco et al.,
2003). We observe instead that some of the EMU countries have strong trade
linkages with countries that do not belong to the euro area for mainly his-
torical or geographical reasons, while others show a pattern of trade that is
more oriented toward intra euro area goods. About ten years after the estab-
lishment of the EMU and despite ever increasing trade integration, member
countries continue to display heterogeneity in their degree of openness toward
countries outside the currency area.2
The heterogeneity along this dimension is relevant for setting the mon-
etary policy stance in a currency area as the transmission mechanism of
external shocks may diﬀer across regions and monetary policy may become
less eﬀective in controlling inﬂation and stabilizing the output gap. Honohan
and Lane (2003 and 2004) show that due to diﬀerences in the degree of ex-
ternal openness, since the adoption of the common currency, exchange rate
movements have had an impact on inﬂation diﬀerentials within the EMU.
∗This paper is a revised version of one chapter of my PhD dissertation, at Universitat
Pompeu Fabra. My supervisor Jordi Gal´ ı provided great advice and support. I beneﬁted
from the comments of two anonymous referees, Paolo Angelini, Jos´ e Dorich, Michele Lenza
and Stefano Neri as well as participants at the CREI Macro Break seminar, Bank of Italy
Lunch seminar, the 2007 ASSET conference, the 2008 Royal Economic Society conference
and “The Euro Area, the Euro and the World Business Cycle” hosted in Aix-en-Provence
in July 2008. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. The views expressed in this
paper do not necessarily coincide with those of the Bank of Italy. Corresponding address:
martina.cecioni@bancaditalia.it
1One of the most recent estimates by Frankel (2008) found that the euro boosted intra-
Eurozone trade by around 10 to 20% on average, in line with what was shown in previous
studies (e.g. Baldwin, 2006).
2Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium stand out in this respect. Between 1997 and
2006, both the average external trade volume over GDP and the average external imports
over GDP ratios of Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands were about three times higher
than the corresponding ratios of the remaining euro-area countries. Furthermore, this is
a rather stable fact over the sample considered.
5The paper sets up a model for an open currency area composed of coun-
tries that have diﬀerent trade linkages with the rest of the world. After
deriving the microfounded welfare measure, it then solves for the optimal
monetary policy from a currency area point of view. Under a plausible cal-
ibration for the EMU it analyzes how the degree of heterogeneity in the
external dimension aﬀects the optimal responses of the macroeconomic vari-
ables to area-wide and asymmetric shocks.
The adoption of a common currency by European countries has spawned
a large body of work on monetary policy in currency areas. The common
driver of these studies is the fact that the economies of EMU member coun-
tries display some structural diﬀerences. One strand of literature has been
devoted to studying and documenting these diﬀerences. For instance, since
the euro-area member countries display large and persistent inﬂation diﬀer-
entials relative to other currency areas (in particular the US)3, considerable
eﬀort has gone into understanding the sources of this dispersion.4
Building on these facts, a second strand of literature has focused on
the optimal design of monetary and ﬁscal policy in currency areas. Be-
nigno (2004) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) study the implications
of, respectively, heterogeneous degrees of stickiness and diﬀerent degrees of
inﬂation persistence among regions for the optimal target of inﬂation in a
currency area. Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009) consider the
role of independent ﬁscal policies in a currency area in which regions share
the same structural features but are hit by asymmetric technology shocks.
The main contribution of this paper is to build external trade linkages
with the rest of the world into a standard model for a currency area and to
study the eﬀect of cross-country dissimilarities on the degree of openness of
the optimal monetary policy design. The main issue is not whether the EMU
is an optimal currency area, but whether, given the institutional setting, the
monetary policy prescriptions that are valid for a homogeneous economy can
be applied to a heterogeneous economy.
The model shares most of its features with the New Open Economy
macroeconomics literature. The parameter for the degree of external open-
ness coincides with the preferences of households in each region for goods
produced by the rest of the world. Symmetrically, the same parameter indi-
3See ECB (2003) for a careful analysis of diﬀerent measures of inﬂation dispersion and
a comparison with the US.
4See, among others, Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) and Rabanal (2009).
6cates the preferences of the rest of the world for the goods produced in each
of the two regions.
When there is heterogeneity as to the degree of external openness, the
dynamics of the area-wide inﬂation and output gap are aﬀected by the rela-
tive competitiveness between regions. Therefore to describe fully the behav-
ior of the area-wide economy the ﬂuctuations of price diﬀerentials must be
taken into account. The intuition for this result is the following. In an open
currency area, shifts in the terms of trade between the monetary union and
the rest of the world (hereafter external terms of trade) aﬀect the demand
for the goods produced in the area and thus its output gap and inﬂation.
As to changes in the relative price between the goods produced in the two
regions (hereafter internal terms of trade), their eﬀects depend on the rest
of the world’s preferences for the goods produced in the two regions (i.e. the
heterogeneity as deﬁned above). If the rest of the world is neutral about
consuming goods from one or the other region of the monetary union, price
diﬀerentials among the regions induce the rest of the world to substitute the
more expensive good with the cheaper one and the aggregate demand for
currency area goods is not aﬀected by them. If, instead, the rest of the world
has a stronger preference for the goods produced by one of the two regions,
this substitution is not perfect and the ﬂuctuations of the internal terms of
trade aﬀect the aggregate demand of currency area goods coming from the
rest of the world.
After deriving a quadratic utility-based loss function for the currency
area, I solve for the full commitment optimal monetary policy from a timeless
perspective. Several studies (e.g. De Paoli, 2009 and Faia and Monacelli,
2008) on the optimal monetary policy in an open economy have shown that,
once one departs from a special parametrization5, the strict domestic inﬂation
stabilization is no longer the ﬁrst best policy and a partial stabilization of
the exchange rate is desirable. This result holds in the case of a homogeneous
currency area open to external trade. The paper shows that in the presence
of heterogeneity the extent to which the exchange rate should be stabilized
is reinforced and higher volatility of area-wide inﬂation is prescribed.
In response to an area-wide technology shock, for instance, the optimal
response in a homogeneous economy is to partially accommodate the shock
5Namely, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption or the in-
tratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods are diﬀerent
from one (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
7by reducing the nominal interest rate to stabilize area-wide inﬂation and the
output gap. This policy generates a depreciation of the monetary union cur-
rency that boosts the external demand of currency area goods. When the
regions of the currency area are heterogeneous, the shock generates higher
inﬂation in the more open country. A depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate would amplify these inﬂation diﬀerentials, as the more open region en-
counters stronger inﬂationary pressures. Since the inﬂation diﬀerentials cause
deadweight losses according to the utility-based welfare of the currency area
(see Benigno, 2004), it is welfare improving to reduce the nominal interest
rate by less in order to attenuate the depreciation of the monetary union
currency. This implies that higher ﬂuctuations of the area-wide inﬂation are
allowed in order to partially dampen those of the inﬂation diﬀerentials caused
by the shock.
The result sheds light on an important point. It is commonly believed
that in a currency area the centralized monetary authority has the ability
to react only to aggregate disturbances while region-speciﬁc shocks can be
stabilized only through other policy instruments, such as national ﬁscal poli-
cies (see Gal´ ı and Monacelli, 2008 and Ferrero, 2009). This paper shows that
in a heterogeneous currency area the central bank, by internalizing that the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy impulses diﬀers across regions,
is able to respond to idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, the optimal pol-
icy plan prescribes to make active use of this channel to inﬂuence inﬂation
diﬀerentials since the aggregate welfare measure for the currency area also
depends on them (see Benigno, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates some
stylized facts about the external openness of EMU countries and describes
the way in which this is incorporated in the model. Section 3 sets up the
model for the currency area. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of heterogeneity
on the dynamics of the model. Section 5 derives and illustrates the optimal
monetary policy plan. Section 6 concludes. The appendix illustrates the de-
tails of the solution of the model, the derivation of the approximated welfare
measure and the equations that characterize the optimal plan.
82 The external openness of EMU countries
Figure 1 plots the degree of total openness against the degree of external
openness of 11 EMU member countries.6 Both indicators are measured as
the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. The degree of total openness refers
to trade ﬂows with all countries whereas the degree of external openness
refers to trade ﬂows with countries that are not in the euro area.7
Figure 1: Degrees of total and external openness












































Notes: Average of quarterly data between 1997 and 2006. The degree of
total and external openness is constructed as the ratio of the imports plus
exports, respectively toward all trading partners and toward countries
that are not members of the euro area, over the GDP. Source: Eurostat.
According to ﬁgure 1, the countries that are more open to external trade
are also those that are more open overall. Furthermore, one can identify three
groups of countries. The ﬁrst includes countries with a relatively low degree
of external and total openness, namely France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and
6Luxembourg, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia are excluded.
7The average degree of total openness across EMU members from 1997 to 2006 is 0.86
and the average degree of external openness over the same period is 0.34. The cross-
country dispersions of the total and external degree of openness, as measured by the
relative standard deviation, are 47% and 54% respectively.
9Spain. Another group includes countries with a relatively high degree of
external and total openness, namely Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.
Finally, there is a third group of countries (Austria, Finland and Germany)
that are in an intermediate position between the two above. This pattern
has been quite stable over the last decade and a similar one can be observed
if the degrees of openness are measured as (total and external) imports over
GDP (see ﬁgure 2, panel (a)). In the composition of trade there is some
dispersion across countries as well (see ﬁgure 2, panel (b)).
I introduce these features of the data in the model by assuming that the
inhabitants of the two regions of the currency area diﬀer in their preferences
for goods produced by the rest of the world (r.o.w.) outside the area. The




















where Ci,t is the consumption good produced in region i = 1, 2 and r.o.w..
This speciﬁcation of preferences implies that the consumption basket of each
region in the currency area includes, in addition to domestically produced
goods, those produced in the other region of the currency area and in the
rest of the world.8
The parameters α and (ω ±ε) can be thought of as degrees of openness
toward each trading partner. In fact, the steady state solution of the model
described in the next section implies that these are the shares of imported
consumption goods in total consumption. Thus, α+ω −ε and α+ω +ε are
the degrees of total openness of regions 1 and 2 respectively.
The proposed assumption on the composition of the consumption bun-
dles in the two regions captures the fact that inside the EMU more open
countries are also more open to external trade. The region that is more open
to external trade (region 2) is also the one that has a lower degree of home
bias (i.e. a higher degree of overall openness) and viceversa. The parameter
α that indicates trade inside the currency area is constant across countries.
This assumption is motivated by the need to keep the model simple by shut-
8In this way the degrees of external and total openness are modeled as a structural
feature of the regions. This is what we observe since the pattern of ﬁgure 1 is quite stable
over the period from 1997 to 2006.
10Figure 2: Other measures of the external openness of EMU countries














































(a) Total and external imports over the GDP)














share of external trade over total trade
share of internal trade over total trade
(b) External trade over total trade
Notes: Average of quarterly data between 1997 and 2006. Source:
Eurostat.
ting down one possible source of asymmetry.9 Indeed the paper focuses on the
9Andr` es et al. (2008) allows for diﬀerences in the degree of openness toward the other
member countries in a model for a closed currency area.
11eﬀects of asymmetry in the degree of exposure to shocks originating outside
the monetary union.
In a trade-balanced steady state, the chosen speciﬁcation implies that
the parameters (ω − ε) and (ω + ε) also indicate the share of the goods
produced respectively in region 1 and 2 requested by the rest of the world.
Under the chosen speciﬁcation, region 2 is more open to external trade than
region 1, not only because its consumption basket is more oriented towards
foreign-produced goods, but also because the rest of the world demands more
of its good. This is one way to capture the fact that some countries in
the EMU have, for historical or geographical reasons, closer linkages with
partners outside the currency area.
The parameter ε is an indicator of the heterogeneity in the preference
toward goods from the r.o.w.. When ε = 0, the two regions have identical
preferences for goods produced outside the currency area and symmetric
preferences for their own produced goods. By setting ε  = 0, the two regions
diverge and the model is able to capture the heterogeneity described in ﬁgure
1.
To introduce heterogeneity in the external dimension of EMU countries,



















where now α indicates the degree of overall openness and α(1 − ω ± ε) the
degree of external openness. In this case it is assumed that the two regions
diﬀer in their patterns of trade but not in the degree of total openness.
This assumption, while consistent with the data shown in ﬁgure 2, is at
odds with the data about the degree of total openness shown in ﬁgure 1.
The assumption of preferences in (1) and (2) is consistent not only with the
facts depicted in ﬁgure 1 but also with the existence of heterogeneity in the
composition of the trade structure.10
10According to preferences (1) and (2), the share of trade with the rest of the world as
a proportion of total trade is given by ω±ε
α+ω±ε and is therefore inﬂuenced by the degree of
heterogeneity in trade, ε.
123 The model
The model presented in this section is a slight modiﬁcation of the New Key-
nesian framework for open economies.11 The world is composed of a currency
area (U) and the rest of the world (ROW). The currency area is formed by
two regions (hereinafter region 1 and 2). Both regions are inhabited by a
continuum of identical households of mass one and are the same size. The
two regions of the monetary union are explicitly modeled while the rest of
the world is described by an exogenous stochastic process on the vector of
the variables of interest.
3.1 Households


















t are the hours of labor supplied by the agent living in region i
and Ci
t is a bundle of consumption goods coming from the two regions of
the currency area and from the rest of the world. The bundles for the two
regions are deﬁned in equations (1) and (2). The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
of preferences implies that the elasticity of substitution among goods is one.
The goods C1,t, C2,t and Crow,t are CES aggregates of diﬀerentiated
varieties of each good and, for i = 1,2 and r.o.w., they are deﬁned as follows12
Ci,t ≡





where h is a generic variety of the diﬀerentiated good i and θ > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among varieties.
The representative household living in country i maximizes (3) subject

















i,t is the price index of the consumption bundle relevant for welfare in
region i expressed in the currency of the monetary union; Di
t+1 is the nominal
11See Lane (2001) for a survey on the so-called New Open Economy macroeconomics.
12Hereinafter the subscript indicates the provenance of the good.
13payoﬀ in t + 1 of the portfolio of state-contingent claims held at the end of
period t; Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead nominal
payoﬀ relevant to the households living in country i; W i
t is the nominal wage
and T i
t are lump-sum transfers. I assume that markets are complete both at
the domestic and international level.
As commonly found in the literature, the household problem can be
solved in two steps. The ﬁrst step implies solving for the optimal allocation
of expenditure across the bundle of goods produced in diﬀerent countries
and across the varieties of each bundle. The solution yields to the following





















t for j  = i
C
1




















Similarly, the demand for goods imported from the rest of the world by
households in the two regions are
C
1






















where St is the nominal exchange rate between the currency of the monetary
union and that of the rest of the world and the asterisk on a variable indicates
that it is expressed in the currency of the rest of the world. Given these
demand functions one can deﬁne the following producer price (PPI) and
consumer price (CPI) indices for the region i = 1,2 of the monetary union
Pi,t =
































14The second step involves the household optimal choice of the hours worked
and of the intertemporal allocation of consumption. The ﬁrst order condi-


























By taking expectations conditional on the information available at time t on

















 = 1 (10)
where Rt = 1/EtQt,t+1 is the return on a riskless bond in the currency of the
monetary union. Under the assumption of complete markets, combining the
Euler equations of each region and assuming that the initial debt holdings























t for i = 1,2. (11)
If σ = 1, i.e. the utility is logarithmic in consumption, the risk sharing is
such that the consumption expenditure in the three countries is the same at
each time t and the model does not exhibit a foreign asset dynamics. Even in
this special parametric case, however, risk sharing is not perfect. In fact, the
existence of home bias in consumption implies that purchasing power parity
(PPP) does not hold.
Moreover, under the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets the equi-
librium price of the foreign riskless bond in terms of the monetary union’s
currency is equal to (R∗
t)−1St = EtQt,t+1St+1. Combining it with the equilib-
rium price of the riskless bond in the currency area (that is Rt = 1/EtQt,t+1),










   
= 0. (12)
153.2 Firms
In each region there is a continuum of mass one of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces a
variety of the diﬀerentiated good in a regime of monopolistic competition. If
a ﬁrm is located in region 1, it can produce only a variety of the consumption
good produced in that region (C1,t). The technology available to produce the




where Ai,t is a technology shock that is region-speciﬁc.
Each ﬁrm chooses the price that maximizes its proﬁt taking as given
demand for its variety. The demand of variety h of the good produced in
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However, price stickiness ` a la Calvo implies that ﬁrms are not able to
change their price whenever they want. Each period there is a probability δ,
independent of time, that the price cannot be changed. This implies that the
optimal price is decided in a forward-looking manner, as a markup charged
over the expected value of future discounted marginal costs. The log-linear
expression for the optimal new price is13
p
new




kEt {rmci,t+k + pi,t}.
where   is the steady state level of the markup and depends on the substi-
tutability among varieties (i.e.   ≡ θ
θ−1) and rmci,t+k are the (log deviation)
of the real marginal costs, deﬁned in the next section.
13Variables written in lower case letters are log deviations from the deterministic steady
state of that variable.
163.3 Equilibrium
The labor market is competitive and its clearing condition implies that ﬁrms’
real marginal costs for i = 1,2 are










where τ is a subsidy to the labor supply and it is assumed to be the same
across regions of the currency area. Before deriving the clearing condition
of the market for goods in each region, one must ﬁrst aggregate across all
varieties both the demand and the supply side. The index for aggregate
output in region i is deﬁned as Yi,t ≡




over all varieties h in equation (13), I obtain the following aggregate demand
function for the goods 1 and 2

























t for i,j = 1,2 and i  = j (15)
To obtain the aggregate production function I make use of the index of aggre-










Yi,t dh. They show that equilibrium variations of
zi,t ≡ logZi,t around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order
and can thus be ignored in a ﬁrst order approximation. The loglinear expres-
sion for the aggregate production function is then
yi,t = ai,t + ni,t.
3.4 Solution of the model
In this section I propose a solution of the model described above that has
three features. First, it is a log linear solution. The optimality conditions
of the ﬁrms and households in each region together with the market clearing
conditions are log linearized around the trade-balanced deterministic steady
state. In this steady state the three countries share the same level of con-
sumption, output and hours. Whenever ε is diﬀerent from zero, the only
17diﬀerence among the steady state equilibrium of each country is the compo-
sition of their consumption bundles.14
Second, instead of obtaining the dynamics of the macroeconomic vari-
ables of each of the two regions of the currency area, I rewrite the model so as
to have a solution for the dynamics of area-wide variables and a solution for
the diﬀerentials between the two regions. I obtain the area-wide variables by
aggregating those of the two regions weighted by their relative size and the
diﬀerentials by comparing the variables in the more open region with those
in the more closed one. In other terms, considering the generic variable x, I
deﬁne the area-wide corresponding variable as xu ≡ mx1 +(1−m)x2, where
m is the size of the region 1, and the diﬀerentials as xr ≡ x2−x1. The model
has therefore two blocks: the area-wide and the diﬀerentials block. Solving
the model in this way allows me to shed light on what is the main contri-
bution of introducing heterogeneity into an otherwise standard framework
of a homogeneous currency area. In the benchmark case I assume that the
regions are of equal size.
Third, I solve the model in the case of fully ﬂexible prices and sticky
prices. As is standard in the literature I then rewrite it in terms of the gaps
between these two equilibria to highlight the eﬀects of nominal rigidities.
Henceforth I use the following deﬁnitions. The internal terms of trade
is the relative price of the good produced in the more open region of the
currency area and the one produced in the less open one, i.e. T in ≡ P2
P1. The
external terms of trade is the relative price between the good produced in the
rest of the world and the aggregate of the goods produced in the currency
area, i.e. T ex ≡
SP ∗
row
Pu . Similarly, the internal real exchange rate is the ratio




1 . The external real exchange
rate is the ratio of the CPIs of the rest of the world and the aggregate of




u . The internal terms of trade and real
exchange rate can be thought of as measures of the producer and consumer
price level diﬀerentials, respectively.
As mentioned above, the rest of the world is not explicitly modeled
and ﬂuctuations in its macroeconomic variables are speciﬁed as exogenous
stochastic processes. In this section I report the equations that describe the
dynamics of the small-scaled version of the model. The reader should refer
14It can be shown that both terms of trade, the one between the two regions of the
currency area and the one between the currency area and the rest of the world, are uniquely
pinned down in the perfect foresight steady state.
18to the appendix for the algebraic derivations behind them.
3.4.1 The equations of the area-wide block
By combining the aggregate demand for the goods produced in the two re-
gions of the currency area (equation (15) for i = 1,2) and using the risk
sharing conditions (11), I obtain the following aggregate demand for the






t + yrow,t − σεt
in
t (16)
where yrow,t is the output of the rest of the world. The parameter σε and
σω are combinations of the structural parameters that aﬀect the openness
dimension of the economy (α,ω,ε), the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (σ) and the size of the regions, which is assumed to be equal
to 0.5 throughout the paper (see appendix A).
Equation (16) is similar to the aggregate demand equation of the open
economy of Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005). Since the currency area economy is
open to the rest of the world and given the assumption of market complete-
ness, a change in the rest of the world output (yrow,t) aﬀects the demand for
currency area goods. Similarly, an increase of the external terms of trade
enhances the competitiveness of the monetary union goods, thus boosting
the aggregate demand for them. When there is no heterogeneity in the pref-
erences, that is ε = 0, the parameter σε is equal to zero.15 In this case the
rest of the world is indiﬀerent between the goods produced in the two regions
and the average level of competitiveness of the currency area goods (tex
t ) is
suﬃcient to determine the aggregate demand for the area goods. When there
is heterogeneity in preferences, that is ε  = 0, the last term in (16) is diﬀerent
from zero and the price dispersion across regions matters. If, ceteris paribus,
the goods produced by the more open region become more competitive (i.e.
tin
t decreases), the demand of currency area goods coming from the rest of
the world increases.
As regards the supply side of the area-wide economy, log linearizing
equation (14) for i = 1,2, substituting for the risk sharing conditions (11)
and aggregating across regions of the currency area, I obtain the following
15In this case, it also turns out that σω = σ
ωσ+(σ−1)(1−ω)ω+(1−ω) and the currency area
economy behaves exactly like the small open economy of Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005).
19expression for the area-wide real marginal costs
rmcu,t = −ν + (σω + ϕ)yu,t + (σ − σω)yrow,t + σωσεt
in
t − (1 + ϕ)au,t. (17)
where ν = −log(1−τ). Since the currency area is an open economy, the real
marginal costs are aﬀected not only by the demand for domestic goods (yu,t)
and by the domestic productivity level (au,t), but also by the world aggregate
demand (yrow,t). For instance, an increase of the domestic and international
demand calls for a higher labor supply that can be provided by households
at higher real wages, driving up the real marginal cost.
In addition, when ε  = 0, the internal terms of trade matter as well. In
fact, in an open economy the real marginal costs depend also on the ratio
between the consumer price level and the producer price level. This is because
the real wage that matters for ﬁrms is deﬂated with the producer price index,
while the one relevant for households is deﬂated with the consumer price
index. If the two economies have the same degree of home bias the area-wide
real marginal cost, aggregated from the two regions real marginal costs, is
aﬀected by the gap between the union CPI and the union PPI which can
be rewritten in terms of the external terms of trade.16 When countries are
heterogeneous in the degree of home bias (or external trade openness) the
gap between the currency area CPI and the PPI does not depend only on
the external terms of trade but also on the internal terms of trade.
Given the expression for the real marginal costs, the natural level of
output, that is the level of output when prices are fully ﬂexible, is given by17
˜ yu,t =














Linearizing and aggregating across regions the ﬁrms’ price optimality con-
ditions imply that the inﬂation dynamics is described by the following New
Keynesian Phillips curve18
πu,t = βEtπu,t+1 + λrmcu,t
where λ=
(1−βδ)(1−δ)
δ . Substituting for the real marginal costs I obtain
16Using equation (16) the external terms of trade can then be rewritten in terms of
domestic and foreign demand, as in equation (17).
17The variables at their natural level are indicated by a tilde ˜ .
18For a complete derivation see Appendix B of Gal` ı and Monacelli (2005).
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x ≡ λ(σω + ϕ) > 0
κ
u
T ≡ λσωσε > 0
In the absence of heterogeneity, the last term of (19) drops and the
dynamics of the currency area inﬂation is described as the standard one
of an open economy. When preferences are heterogeneous, inﬂationary or
deﬂationary pressures arise also in the case in which the relative price of the
currency area goods is not at its natural level.19 A positive internal terms
of trade gap indicates that the price of good 1, the one preferred by most
of the currency area citizens, is lower than it should be in the ﬂexible price
equilibrium. This brings about an ineﬃcient reallocation of resources from
region 2 toward region 1, generating an increase in the aggregate demand
for currency area goods (beyond the one captured by the area-wide output
gap term) that drives up inﬂation. The opening of an internal terms of
trade gap implies that there is a trade-oﬀ between the output gap and the
inﬂation stabilization in the currency area and that the complete stabilization
of inﬂation is not equivalent to the stabilization of the gap between the actual
and the natural output level. This trade-oﬀ arises endogenously after any
misalignments of the price diﬀerentials from their natural level ˜ tin
t .
From the household intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions I obtain the
following IS curve
xu,t = Etxu,t+1 + σεEt∆(t
in





(rt − Etπu,t+1 −   rru,t) (20)
where   rru,t is the natural rate of interest, which is a function of the primitive
shocks in the currency area economy
  rru,t ≡ φyrowEt∆yrow,t+1 + φtinEt∆˜ t
in
t+1 + φauEt∆au,t+1.
19Note that in a ﬁrst order approximation the only relevant relative price in the currency
area is the internal terms of trade.
21where φyrow, φtin and φau are deﬁned in the appendix. Interestingly, the
internal terms of trade gap also plays a role in the aggregate demand side of
the currency area economy.20
3.4.2 The equations of the diﬀerentials block
The dynamics of the inﬂation diﬀerentials in the currency area are given by
πr,t = βEtπr,t+1 + λrmcr,t.
After solving for the diﬀerence of the real marginal costs in the more and less
open region, the inﬂation diﬀerentials are given by the following equation
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x ≡ λξexσω > 0
κ
r
T ≡ λ(ξin + ξexσωσε) < 0
As speciﬁed in the appendix, the parameter ξex is equal to zero when
ε = 0. Hence, heterogeneity implies that the area-wide variables, namely the
output gap, aﬀect the dynamics of the diﬀerentials.
Benigno (2004) points out the disconnection of the terms of trade dy-
namics from the area-wide block of the model in a currency area with ho-
mogenous regions hit by asymmetric shocks and the inability for the authority
that controls the area-wide nominal interest rate to aﬀect the diﬀerentials.
This is a feature of the proposed model when ε = 0. Instead, when ε  = 0,
the area-wide and diﬀerence blocks of the model cannot be solved separately.
When prices are fully ﬂexible, the internal terms of trade is aﬀected
by asymmetric shocks (i.e. ar,t) and, whenever there is heterogeneity across
regions, by the area-wide shocks (i.e. au,t and yrow,t). The natural internal
terms of trade is thus
˜ t
in
t = γyrowyrow,t + γauau,t − γarar,t. (22)
where γyrow, γau and γar are deﬁned in the appendix.
The block of the model that describes the behavior of the diﬀerentials
within the currency area is closed by specifying the dynamics of the internal
20The determinants of natural internal terms of trade are deﬁned in the next section.
22terms of trade gap. From the deﬁnition of the internal terms of trade (i.e.
tin
t ≡ p2,t − p1,t) this is given by
t
in




t−1 − ˜ t
in
t−1 + πr,t − (˜ t
in
t − ˜ t
in
t−1). (23)
4 The eﬀects of heterogeneity
This section analyzes quantitatively the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the dynam-
ics of the area-wide inﬂation and output gap, the inﬂation diﬀerentials and
the terms of trade in the model set up above. I ﬁrst describe the calibration
for the EMU and then I study the transmission mechanism of a symmetric
technology shock under an ad hoc monetary policy rule.
4.1 Calibration
The time period is the quarter. The value for the time-discount parameter
β is set equal to 0.99 so that the steady state real interest rate is 4% in
annual terms. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ
is set equal to 2. There is no clear evidence on what should be the value of
this parameter. However, in studying the eﬀects of external developments on
the domestic economy in the case of complete markets, one wants to depart
from the case of logarithmic utility (i.e. σ = 1) because it implies that the
external inﬂuences on the domestic economy are shut down and the open
economy is isomorphic to the closed one.21 The parameter ϕ represents the
inverse of the labor supply elasticity and, as is common in the real business
cycle literature, it is set at 3. The elasticity of substitution between varieties
of each diﬀerentiated good (θ) is equal across countries and it is set so that
the steady state mark up is 1.2. Therefore, θ equals 6. I calibrate the
Calvo parameter δ, which indicates the degree of price stickiness using the
standard value of 0.75, as it is frequent in the literature. This implies an
average duration of the price contract of four quarters.
The parameters for the degrees of openness that need to be calibrated
are α, ω and ε. The ﬁrst one is the degree of internal openness and it is
calibrated as the average of the GDP share of imports from other members
of the union across 11 European countries.22 In fact, there is heterogeneity
21See Clarida et al. (2001).
22Luxembourg, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia are excluded.
23across member countries in this parameter too. However, for the reasons
explained in section 2, I restrict it to be the same across countries so as
to insulate the eﬀect of heterogeneity in the degree of external openness.
Hence, I set α = 0.25. The parameter for external openness ω is set equal
to the average of the GDP share of the external imports across 11 member
countries of the euro area, that is ω = 0.17. The parameter that measures
heterogeneity ε takes the values of 0 and 0.14. The former represents the
theoretical case of homogeneous regions whereas the latter is set so that ω+ε
is the average degree of external openness across the more open countries (the
Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland).
There are three sources of exogenous ﬂuctuations in the model: the
aggregate technology shock au,t, the asymmetric technology shock ar,t and
the external shock yrow,t. I assume that their stochastic processes are all
AR(1). To calibrate the parameters of the external shock process I use the
log of the world demand variable of the Area Wide Model dataset (Fagan et
al., 2001) and I ﬁt the following univariate trend-stationary process 23
yrow,t = 0.60 + 0.0003t + 0.94yrow,t−1 + ǫrow,t.
The standard deviation of the innovations is σyrow = 0.005859. In order
to calibrate the shocks for the area-wide productivity and diﬀerentials, I
consider the primitive technology shocks in the two regions and I specify
them as
a1,t = ρa1,t−1 + ǫ1,t
a2,t = ρa2,t−1 + ǫ2,t.
The persistence parameter ρ and the standard deviation of the innovation
σǫ are the same across regions and equal respectively to 0.94 and 0.0061,
based on the evidence of Smets and Wouters (2005) for the entire euro area.
Moreover the shocks are uncorrelated across regions (i.e. corr(ǫ1,t,ǫ2,t) = 0).
Hence, the processes for au,t ≡ ma1,t + (1 − m)a2,t and ar,t ≡ a2,t − a1,t have
the following speciﬁcation
au,t = ρau,t−1 + ǫu,t
ar,t = ρar,t−1 + ǫr,t
where the variance of the innovations are σ2





23I used quarterly data from 1970:1 until 2005:4.
244.2 The transmission mechanism of area-wide
technology shocks
To highlight the eﬀect of heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism of an
exogenous disturbance and its interaction with nominal rigidities, I consider
the responses to an i.i.d. area-wide technology shock under a monetary policy
regime of strict inﬂation targeting. The monetary policy is represented by
the following targeting rule
πu,t = 0.
Figure 3 displays the responses of the area-wide and diﬀerentials vari-
ables to a positive one percent symmetric shock in technology (au) in the
case of homogeneous (solid line) and heterogeneous regions (starred line).
A positive technology shock induces a decline in the natural interest rate
of the currency area. In order to keep inﬂation stable the monetary authority
fully accommodates this decline by decreasing the nominal interest rate. If
the rest of the world does not respond to the shock, the monetary policy
response generates a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate on impact
and an increase of the external terms of trade.
When the regions of the currency area are homogeneous (i.e. ε = 0)
the dynamics of the model are standard. Under the policy of strict inﬂation
stabilization, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate so that the
area-wide inﬂation remains stable. This policy results in closing the gap be-
tween the actual and natural output level. The currency area goods are more
competitive following the exogenous rise in productivity and the deprecia-
tion of the nominal exchange rate induced by the monetary policy response.
Moreover, the internal terms of trade is not aﬀected by the area-wide tech-
nology shock and no inﬂation diﬀerentials are generated.
When the regions of the currency area have diﬀerent degrees of exposure
to the rest of the world (i.e. ε  = 0), the nominal depreciation generated by
the monetary policy response has a diﬀerent impact on the two regions. The
demand for the goods produced by the more open region (good 2) increases
more than the one for the other goods produced in the area. The diﬀerent
demand pressures induce an adjustment of the relative price of the goods in
the two regions, that is an increase in the internal terms of trade.
The dynamics of the inﬂation diﬀerentials are driven by the gap between
the actual internal terms of trade and its ﬂexible price level and by the area-
wide output gap. As pointed out by Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004), the
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complete price stabilization brought about by the policy rule considered here
has the eﬀect of inducing a sluggish response of the actual internal terms of
trade.24 The internal terms of trade gap is thus negative on impact and pos-
itive in subsequent periods. A negative internal terms of trade gap indicates
that, due to nominal rigidities, the relative price of the goods produced in
24Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) focus on changes in the natural level of the relative
price (or internal terms of trade) caused by asymmetric shocks across countries (or sectors).
Here these changes are brought about by the heterogeneous transmission mechanism of a
symmetric shock.
26the more open region is lower than in the ﬂexible price equilibrium. This
generates inﬂationary pressures on that region and thus an inﬂation diﬀer-
ential. The increase of the area-wide output gap in the quarter of the shock
exacerbates the eﬀect on the inﬂation diﬀerentials. Inheriting the sluggish-
ness of the internal terms of trade, the inﬂation diﬀerentials are slightly more
persistent than the shock that generates them.25
5 Optimal monetary policy
I compute and analyze the solution of the model presented above under a
policy that maximizes the welfare of the currency area households. I obtain a
microfounded measure of welfare by taking a second order approximation of
the utilities of the currency area citizens. The optimal monetary policy prob-
lem takes the form of a standard linear-quadratic optimization problem as is
common in the literature.26 In this section I describe the distortions of the
market allocation with respect to the Pareto eﬃcient one, the welfare mea-
sure adopted and some moments that characterize the optimal policy plan,
namely the impulse response functions after an area-wide and an asymmet-
ric technology shock. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the two
regions are of equal size. In the last subsection, I consider the case in which
the more open region is smaller in order to check how size aﬀects the results.
5.1 Flexible price equilibrium and the Pareto eﬃcient
allocation
In the open currency area described above three distortions move the market
allocation away from the Pareto eﬃcient one. Firstly, ﬁrm’s market power
lowers the output relative to the one in the eﬃcient equilibrium. Secondly,
the presence of nominal rigidities alter the relative prices, thereby causing
a misallocation of resources across the varieties of the diﬀerentiated goods.
25Whenever there is heterogeneity across regions, the sluggishness of the internal terms
of trade is transmitted to the area-wide variables. The eﬀect is, however, quantitatively
small in a two-region economy. Carlstrom et al. (2006) show that diﬀerences in the degree
of price stickiness or asymmetric sectoral monetary policy responses generate movements
in relative prices that aﬀect the inﬂation and output gap in aggregate. In this case,
asymmetric responses to area-wide shocks, due to heterogeneity in preferences, is what
generates a terms of trade dynamics.
26See Benigno and Woodford (2006).
27Furthermore, the market equilibrium allocation does not take into account
the incentive to distort the terms of trade with the rest of the world in a
way that is beneﬁcial to the currency area citizens.27 The social planner
of the currency area, in fact, would tend to increase domestic consumers’
purchasing power internationally. An improvement in the external terms of
trade induces the currency area citizens to consume more of the imported
good, reducing the hours worked without diminishing their overall level of
consumption. Heterogeneity per se does not introduce a distortion in the
economy. It is the stickiness of prices coupled with the fact that the nominal
exchange rate across regions is irrevocably ﬁxed that generates an additional
distortion in the economy: the sluggish adjustment of the relative price of
the goods produced in the two regions after a shock implies a misallocation
of the resources.28
Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) show the optimality of strict domestic in-
ﬂation stabilization for a special parametrization under which both the in-
tertemporal and the intratemporal elasticities of substitution are equal to
unity. In this case a constant subsidy to monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in
steady state is suﬃcient to guarantee the coincidence between the ﬂexible
price allocation and the eﬃcient one. When the subsidy is implemented,
the only distortion left in the economy is price stickiness; setting inﬂation
to zero delivers the Pareto eﬃcient allocation. However, in this special case
the economy behaves as if it is closed. Faia and Monacelli (2008) and De
Paoli (2009) relax these assumptions and show that, in the more realistic
case in which the three distortions mentioned above are in place, the markup
stabilization implemented by the ﬂexible price allocation is not optimal and
some inﬂation volatility, together with a partial stabilization of the exchange
rate, is instead advisable.
Since this paper studies how the degree of openness aﬀects monetary
policy design in a currency area it is important to consider a calibration so
that the currency area economy is not isomorphic to a closed one. For this
reason in the benchmark calibration the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution is diﬀerent from one. Thus, in the open currency area, even when
the labor subsidy is in place, the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation is not
optimal, independently to the degree of heterogeneity across regions.
27See, among others, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and De Paoli (2009).
28Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) highlight this distortion.
285.2 The currency area welfare function
This subsection describes the welfare measure for the currency area economy,
which is based on the discounted sum of the future utility ﬂows of the house-
holds of both regions of the monetary union. For region i = 1,2 the utility


















Depending on the region in which they live, there are two types of agents
in the currency area. As monetary policy is decided at an area-wide level,
the relevant welfare function must be only one and a criterion to aggregate
the utility functions of each type of agent is needed. I consider a utilitarian
social welfare function. Among the aggregation functions, this speciﬁcation
places less emphasis on the heterogeneity across regions and implies that the
currency area welfare function is a weighted average of the welfare of each















In order to have the optimal monetary policy problem in the standard
linear-quadratic form I take a second order Taylor expansion of the utility
ﬂows of each region around the optimal deterministic steady state. Then I
aggregate across regions and, after substituting for the linear terms using the
second order approximation of the model’s equilibrium condition, I obtain a
purely quadratic approximation of the currency area welfare function. The









































+ t.i.p. + o( ξ 
3)
29Details on the derivation of this function are in the Appendix. A double tilde˜ ˜on a
variable indicates that it is at its eﬃcient level.
29where a double tilde on a variable indicates its eﬃcient level, t.i.p. stands
for terms independent from policy and o( ξ 
3) contains all terms that are
of order higher than two in the given bound for the vector of shocks ξ ≡
[yrow au ar]
′. The deadweight losses are generated by any deviation of the
actual variables from their eﬃcient level. The parameters Φs are functions of
the structural parameters of the model and their values under the baseline
calibration described in section 4.1 are reported in table 1.








When ε = 0, the loss function in (24) is similar to the one obtained in
Benigno (2004). In particular, compared with the loss function of a closed
economy, there are two additional quadratic terms beyond the ones on inﬂa-
tion and the output gap: the internal terms of trade gap and the inﬂation
diﬀerentials. The deviation of the internal terms of trade from its eﬃcient
level generates losses as resources are ineﬃciently moved from one region to
the other. As explained above, the internal terms of trade does not adjust
immediately to region-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations because there is price stickiness
and the nominal exchange rate is irrevocably ﬁxed.
Moreover, equation (24) features not only a term that penalizes the
ﬂuctuations in area-wide inﬂation, but also one that penalizes those in the
inﬂation diﬀerentials. As shown by Woodford (2003, ch. 6) the presence of
nominal rigidities in the form of Calvo price stickiness generates a motive for
inﬂation stabilization. Since we assumed that this distortion in the market
equilibrium is present in the production of goods in both regions, implement-
ing the eﬃcient allocation requires that the inﬂation of the domestic goods
produced in each region is stabilized. A loss function that penalizes only the
aggregate currency area inﬂation does not guarantee that the volatilities of
the national inﬂations will be minimized. What is required is that both the
30area-wide inﬂation and the diﬀerentials across regions are stabilized.30
When ε  = 0, the negative comovement between the area-wide output
gap and the internal terms of trade gap gives rise to a deadweight loss (Φxu,tin
is zero when ε = 0 and negative when ε > 0). A positive internal terms
of trade gap indicates a competitive advantage for the country that is less
oriented towards producing goods for the rest of the world market, inducing
a decline in the demand for currency area goods coming from the rest of
the world. When this is coupled with a negative area-wide output gap the
eﬃciency cost of the shift of the work eﬀort toward the more competitive
country is higher.
5.3 The IRFs to an area-wide technology shock under
the optimal plan
Figure 4 describes the impulse response functions (IRFs) to an area-wide
technology shock under the optimal policy plan, comparing the case in which
regions are homogeneous (ε = 0) with the one in which regions are heteroge-
neous (ε = 0.14).31
An area-wide technology shock increases the relative competitiveness of
the currency area goods with respect to those produced in the rest of the
world. The optimal policy accommodates this increase in competitiveness
through a nominal exchange rate depreciation and an increase in the external
terms of trade tex
t . Due to the external terms of trade externality, however,
the social planner wants to partially dampen the response of the exchange
rate, therefore the area-wide inﬂation is not perfectly stabilized after the
shock. When regions are homogeneous, an area-wide shock aﬀects all member
countries of the area equally; thus the internal terms of trade gap and the
inﬂation diﬀerential do not move.
When regions are open to diﬀerent degrees toward the rest of the world,
the more open region (region 2) beneﬁts more from the gain in competitive-
ness as the rest of the world prefers its goods to the ones produced in the other
region. Hence, in the ﬂexible price equilibrium, the higher demand of good 2
leads to an increase in its relative price. In the sticky price equilibrium, the
internal terms of trade gap cannot adjust immediately and a negative terms










31The equations that fully describe the optimal policy plan are speciﬁed in the appendix.
31Figure 4: IRFs to a positive area-wide technology shock under the
optimal policy
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Notes: The shock is equal to 1% st dev of the area-wide technology. The starred line is the
homogeneity case (ε = 0); the solid line the heterogeneity one (ε = 0.14).
of trade gap opens. This induces higher inﬂationary pressures in the more
open region and therefore an increase in inﬂation diﬀerentials.
The optimal policy must balance the objective of stabilizing the area-
wide output gap and inﬂation with the one of stabilizing the inﬂation dif-
32ferentials and the internal terms of trade. It thus prefers to attenuate the
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate relative to the homogeneous case
since this depreciation would amplify the inﬂation diﬀerentials across regions.
This implies that the area-wide inﬂation displays a larger volatility when re-
gions are heterogeneous. The presence of heterogeneity, therefore, induces a
stronger motive for exchange rate stabilization and goes against the complete
stabilization of inﬂation.
Figure 5 displays the responses of the nominal interest rate, following
each of the shocks of the model, which is implied by the optimal policy
plan. After a positive technology shock the nominal interest rate reacts
more on impact when regions are heterogeneous than in the homogeneous
case; afterward it decreases more sharply in the homogeneous case in order
to allow for a stronger depreciation in the monetary union currency. The
opposite happens when a shock coming from the rest of the world hits the
currency area economy.
Figure 6 shows the responses of the main macroeconomic variables to
an area-wide technology shock under a policy of strict inﬂation stabilization
and under the optimal policy when regions are heterogeneous.32 In this case
the complete stabilization of the area-wide inﬂation does not imply the sta-
bilization of the welfare-relevant output gap. The heterogenous transmission
mechanism across regions induces ﬂuctuations of the distance of the internal
terms of trade from its eﬃcient level, which in turn aﬀect the relationship
between area-wide inﬂation and the output gap as described by the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. Compared to the optimal policy, a strict inﬂation
targeting rule induces a stronger response of the nominal exchange rate of
the currency area and generates higher inﬂation diﬀerentials. Both these
variables are instead partially stabilized under the optimal policy.
Under the benchmark calibration, the relatively considerable weight on
the inﬂation diﬀerentials in the objective of the currency area central bank
induces the social planner to care about inﬂation diﬀerentials stabilization.
However, it is the interaction between the area-wide and the diﬀerence block
of the model introduced by the heterogeneity in the external openness that
allows the central bank to aﬀect them even if it controls only the area-wide
interest rate. The optimal policy plan internalizes that with heterogeneity the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy impulses diﬀers across regions
and makes active use of it in order to inﬂuence the diﬀerentials.
32The strict inﬂation stabilization policy is described by the targeting rule πu,t = 0.
33Figure 5: The IRFs of the nominal interest rate under the optimal policy
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5.4 The IRFs to an asymmetric technology shock
under the optimal plan
Figure 7 displays the impulse response functions to an asymmetric technol-
ogy shock (ar,t). It can be interpreted as a shock in the eﬃciency level of
the production of one good of the currency area relative to the other. In
particular, a positive variation of ar,t implies a gain in competitiveness in the
more open region (region 2) relative to the more closed one (region 1).
Following the shock, a positive internal terms of trade gap opens because
the presence of price stickiness implies that the relative price across regions
34Figure 6: The IRFs to a positive area-wide technology shock under
diﬀerent policy regimes
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Notes: The IRFs are obtained for a calibration of ε = 0.14 under the optimal policy (solid
line) and the strict inﬂation targeting (IT) regime (starred line)
does not adjust immediately. This gap aﬀects the inﬂation diﬀerentials: in-
ﬂation is higher in region 1 because the distortion in the relative price caused
by the stickiness ineﬃciently boosts the demand of good 1.
35Figure 7: The IRFs to an asymmetric technology shock under the optimal
policy plan
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Notes: The asymmetric shock is an exogenous increase in the relative productivity of
the more open region; the starred line is the homogeneity case (ε = 0); the solid line the
heterogeneity one (ε = 0.14).
When the regions are homogenous, the area-wide variables are not af-
fected by the shock and only the relative prices and quantities adjust. The
diﬀerential block of the model is disconnected from the area-wide one and
36monetary policy, having as the only instrument the currency union nominal
interest rate, cannot undo the distortion in the internal terms of trade gener-
ated by nominal rigidities. When, instead, ε  = 0 the area-wide inﬂation and
output gap are aﬀected. Since sizable inﬂation diﬀerentials generate welfare
losses, the central bank raises the output gap under the optimal policy in or-
der to partially mitigate the inﬂation diﬀerentials (see equation (21)). This
in turn aﬀects the area-wide inﬂation that it is slightly increasing after the
shock.
5.5 The eﬀect of the size of the regions
One of the common features of the more open block of countries of the EMU
is that they are smaller in size compared to the less open block. It is thus of
interest to analyze how the size of the two regions aﬀects the results.
Figure 8: The eﬀect of region size on the inﬂation response to a
technology shock in the optimal policy
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Figure 8 displays the optimal response of the area-wide inﬂation to a
37positive 1% standard deviation of the area-wide technology shock when the
regions have the same size (left panel) and when the size of region 2, the one
that is more open to the rest of the world, is one third of the total size of the
currency area (right panel).
When the regions are the same size, the response of inﬂation in an
economy with heterogeneous degrees of external openness (i.e. ε = 0.14)
is almost twice as strong as that in the region with homogeneous degrees
of openness. When instead region 2 is smaller than region 1, the decrease
of inﬂation on impact is about 40% stronger when ε = 0.14 than in the
homogeneity case.
6 Conclusions
The degree of external openness is an important element that shapes the
transmission mechanism of global shocks in the EMU countries. Evidence
shows that the member countries diﬀer in this respect.
The paper highlights the eﬀects of heterogeneity on external trade open-
ness among the regions of a currency area in the optimal design of monetary
policy. It builds a framework for an open currency area economy composed
of two regions that have diﬀerent preferences toward the goods produced by
the rest of the world outside the currency area. After obtaining a welfare
measure that is consistent with the model and microfounded, the optimal
monetary policy from the currency area viewpoint is derived.
When the currency area regions have diﬀerent degrees of external open-
ness, both the transmission mechanism of the shocks and the microfounded
welfare function diﬀer from the baseline case of a homogeneous currency area.
Heterogeneity in external trade generates a stronger motive for exchange rate
stabilization in the optimal policy plan. Accordingly, more inﬂation volatil-
ity is advisable. For example, after a positive area-wide technology shock
the central bank should not accommodate the shock perfectly and should
decrease the nominal interest rate by less than what is predicted by the opti-
mal policy for a homogeneous currency area. In this way the union nominal
exchange rate depreciation is lower and the inﬂation diﬀerentials, generated
by the diﬀerent exposure of the two regions toward the rest of the world, are
partially alleviated.
The results of the paper suggest that some degree of heterogeneity across
regions is suﬃcient for the cross-region dispersion to inﬂuence the area-wide
38variables dynamics and to be of importance for welfare. The optimal mone-
tary policy plan takes into account the structural diﬀerences across regions
and balances the welfare losses coming from area-wide inﬂation and the out-
put gap with those coming from the inﬂation diﬀerentials.
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41Appendix
A The (Sum and Diﬀerence) Solution of the
Model
In this appendix I derive in detail the solution of the model in terms of area-
wide and diﬀerentials variables (that is the equations described in Section
3.4). I consider the case in which the two regions of the currency area have
equal size (i.e. m = 0.5). I loglinearized the model around the trade-balanced
deterministic steady state. For a generic variable x I deﬁne the area-wide
corresponding variable as xu ≡ mx1 + (1 − m)x2 and the diﬀerentials as
xr ≡ x2 − x1. As speciﬁed above, I assume that the rest of the world is a
large country relative to the currency area (speciﬁcally, the amount of goods
produced in the currency area and consumed by the rest of the world is
negligible in its basket of consumption, thus one can say Crow = Yrow).
A.1 Derivation of equation (16)



























Using the risk sharing conditions (11) to substitute for the consumption of





















































where I used the following deﬁnitions for the internal and external terms of
trade and real exchange rates
t
in = p2 − p1
42t










row + s − p
c
u.
Using (6) and (7) I derived the (log linearized) relationships between the
(internal and external) terms of trade and the real exchange rates
q
in












t + (1 − ω)t
ex
t . (27)
Substituting (26) and (27) into the aggregate demand of goods produced in































Φ ≡ 1 +
σ − 1
σ
(1 − 2α − 2ω)
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Notice that when ε = 0, Γ1 = Γ2 = 1 + σ−1
σ (1 − ω). When the utility is
logarithmic (i.e. σ = 1), Γ1 = Γ2 = Φ = 1. Aggregating over the regions of














Using (11), the following risk sharing condition between the currency area

























































When σ = 1 (i.e. log utility in consumption) the parameter σω is equal
to one and σε is equal to zero independently of ε33.
A.2 Derivation of equation (17)
From the labor market clearing condition (14) for both regions of the currency
area using the production function and the deﬁnition of the internal and
external terms of trade, I obtain the following log linear expressions for the
real marginal costs in region 1 and 2
rmc1,t = −ν + σc1








t + (ω − ε)tex
t − (1 + ϕ)a1,t (32)
rmc2,t = −ν + σc2








t + (ω + ε)tex
t − (1 + ϕ)a2,t. (33)
Aggregating over the regions of the currency area the area-wide real
marginal costs are
rmcu,t = −ν + σc
u







t − (1 + ϕ)au,t.
Using the risk sharing condition (31) and substituting tex
t using (16), I obtain
equation (17) of the text, that is
rmcu,t = −ν + (σω + ϕ)yu,t + (σ − σω)yrow,t + σωσεt
in
t − (1 + ϕ)au,t
33This is the special case in which an open economy is isomorphic to a closed economy.
See Clarida et al. (2001).
44A.3 Derivation of equation (20)
From the intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions of the households living in the














Using (6) and (7) and the deﬁnition of the terms of trade, the following is
the relationship between the CPI and the PPI inﬂation in the currency area
π
c








Substituting the last expression and (30) into the area-wide Euler equation
above, I have
















. Using equation (16) to substitute
for tex
t and rearranging the terms, I obtain





(rt − Etπu,t+1) + ΘσEt∆yrow,t+1
Adding and subtracting the natural rate of the currency area output (18)
and rearranging terms, I can rewrite the IS equation in terms of the output
gap and the real interest rate gap as in equation (20), that is
xu,t = Etxu,t+1 + σεEt∆(t
in





(rt − Etπu,t+1 −   rru,t).
The natural rate of the real interest rate is deﬁned as
  rru,t ≡ φy∗Et∆y
∗
t+1 + φtinEt∆˜ t
in
t+1 + φauEt∆au,t+1














45A.4 Derivation of equation (21) and (22)
In order to obtain the equation that describes the dynamics of the inﬂation
diﬀerentials between the two regions of the currency area, I derive the real
marginal costs diﬀerentials. Subtracting (32) from (33) I have the diﬀerentials
of real marginal costs
rmcr,t = σc
r




t − (1 + ϕ)ar,t. (34)
Subtracting (28) from (29), I have the following expression for the diﬀerentials













t +[(ω + ε)Γ2 − (ω − ε)Γ1]t
ex
t +cr,t.






































2ε + ϕ[(ω + ε)Γ2 − (ω − ε)Γ1] + 2ε.
Notice that when ε = 0, ξex = 0 implying that the external competitiveness
of the currency area toward the rest of the world is not aﬀecting the real
marginal cost diﬀerentials inside the union. Substituting tex
t using equation
(16), I have
rmcr,t = (ξin + ξexσωσε)t
in
t + ξexσωyu,t − ξexσωyrow,t − (1 + ϕ)ar,t (35)
In the ﬂexible price equilibrium the real marginal costs are equal to the
opposite of the mark up in both regions. Since the monopolistic distortion is
assumed to be the same across regions of the currency area, the diﬀerential of
the real marginal costs is equal to zero when prices are fully ﬂexible. Making
46use of this fact, by setting equation (35) equal to zero I obtain the expression
for the internal terms of trade that is in (22), that is
˜ t
in




ξin(σω + ϕ) + ϕξexσωσε
γau ≡ −
(1 + ϕ)ξexσω
ξin(σω + ϕ) + ξexϕσωσε
γar ≡
(1 + ϕ)(σω + ϕ)
ξin(σω + ϕ) + ξexϕσωσε
.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve for the inﬂation diﬀerentials is given by
πr,t = βEtπr,t+1 + λrmcr,t.
Thus, using (35) and (22), I obtain equation (21) of the text.
B Derivation of the approximated welfare loss
function















































+t.i.p. + o( ξ 
3)
where in t.i.p. are collected all terms that are independent from the monetary
policy and in o( ξ 3) the terms that are of order higher than two. To sub-
stitute for the hours worked ni,t I used the production function aggregated
47for all varieties produced in the same country. That is, in log linear terms,
yi,t = ni,t + ai,t − zi,t.
I deﬁne the welfare function for the whole currency area as the weighted
average of the welfare measures in the two regions. The weights are given
by the size of each region. Among the possible aggregation function, the
speciﬁcation of an utilitarian social welfare function is the one that gives less
weight to the heterogeneity across regions. The welfare in the two regions
are aggregated using, according to which the utility ﬂows of the two regions
are aggregated using a linear function. Thus
Wu,t ≡ mW1,t + (1 − m)W2,t
For now I am assuming that the two regions have equal size (m = 0.5).
Gal` ı and Monacelli (2005) showed that zi,t = θ
2varj (πi,t) = θ
2λπ2
i,t. Using
this result, the currency area approximated welfare function can be rewritten
as follows34
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Φ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 (1 − σ) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
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In order to get the appropriate welfare approximation I need to elimi-
nate the linear terms w′
yyt in the second order approximation (36). Following
Benigno and Woodford (2006), I can do it using the second order Taylor ex-
pansion of some of the equilibrium conditions of the model. I consider the
following equilibrium conditions: a) The aggregate demand of goods pro-
duced in the currency area (i.e. the weighted average of equations (15) for
i,j = 1,2 and i  = j) ; b) The relative demand of goods produced in the two
regions of the currency area (i.e. the diﬀerence between (15) when i = 2 and
i = 1) ; c) The risk sharing condition between the currency area and the
rest of the world (i.e. Cu,t = (Qex
t )
1
σCrow,t); d) The risk sharing condition
between the regions inside the currency area (i.e. Cr,t = (Qin
t )− 1
σ); e) The
deﬁnition of the real exchange rate of the currency area with the rest of the
world (i.e. Qex




2); f) The deﬁnition of the real exchange rate
between the regions of the currency area (i.e. Qin
t = (T in
t )1−2α−ω(T ex
t )2ε); g)
The labor market clearing condition aggregated for all regions in the currency
area (i.e. the weighted average of (14) for i = 1,2); h) The labor market
clearing condition in diﬀerences between regions in the currency area (i.e.
the diﬀerence between (14) when i = 2 and when i = 1).
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0 0 0 0 x5,5 x5,6 0 0
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tDξξt] + o( ξ 
3) = 0 (40)
d
′
y = [ 0 0 0 0 − 1
σ 0 0 −1]
Dy = 0
Dξ = 0
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Eliminating the linear term in (36) implies ﬁnding the vector Lx such that
wy =
 
ay by cy dy ey fy gy hy
 
Lx
where Lx has dimension 8 by 1.

















t] + t.i.p. + o( ξ 
3) (45)
where
Ly = Wy + AyLx1 + ByLx2
Lξ = Wξ + GξLx7 + HξLx8
Lπ = Wπ
In order to write the welfare in terms of the currency area output, the output
diﬀerentials in the two regions, the internal and external terms of trade, the
currency area inﬂation and the regions’ inﬂation diﬀerentials, I construct the
mapping N such that
y
′
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The new coeﬃcients are in the matrix H = Q′M′N′LyNMQ and Hξ =
















′ + [yu,t t
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The period loss function, written in terms of gap of the variables from







u,t + Φxu(yu,t − ˜ ˜ yu,t)
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Φxu,tin = [H(1,2) + H(2,1)]
Φπu = Wπ(1,1)
Φπr = Wπ(2,2)
The eﬃcient equilibrium level of the area-wide output and the internal
terms of trade is given by the following equations
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[H(1,2) + H(2,1)]˜ ˜ yu,t − Hξ(2,1)yrow,t − Hξ(2,2)au,t − Hξ(2,3)ar,t
 








These coeﬃcients are equal to those of Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) with the
exception of the internal terms of trade that is a result of aggregating the
welfare functions of the two regions.
C The Optimal Policy Plan
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Calling λ1,t, λ3,t and λ3,t the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
three constraints above, the following are the ﬁrst order conditions with
respect to πu,t, πr,t, xu,t and (tin
t −˜ tin
t ) of the full commitment optimal policy
problem.
Φπuπu,t + λ1,t − λ1,t−1 = 0 (46)
Φxu
 











x = 0 (47)














T + λ3,t − βλ3,t+1 = 0 (49)
56Equations (46)-(49), the structural equations of the model (equations
(19), (21) and (23)), i.e. the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to the La-
grange multipliers, together with the stochastic processes speciﬁed for the
three exogenous variables, au,t, ar,t and yrow,t, fully describe the dynamics of
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